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any way, the conclusion necessarily follows that the case falls
under the more general principle of international law which
has just been stated, and hence that the United States had the
right to seize and condemn the "Sayward."

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PUTNAM NAIL CO. v. DULANEY.
SYLLABUS.
Where a distinctive mark, incapable of becoming a technical trademark, is adopted by a man to distinguish his goods from similiar goods
of other people, its fraudulent imitation by another man, for the purpose of deceiving purchasers and passing off his goods as those of the
first man, will not be restrained by a Court of Equity.
Plaintiff manufactured horseshoe-nails and had obtained a reputation for them. He bronzed certain classes of them, solely to distinguish
them from the goods of other manufacturers. Defendant imitated this
bronzing on his nails for the purpose of deceiving purchasers and
passing off his nails as those of the plaintiff, and securing the advantage
of plaintiff's reputation.
Held: The act of bronzing horseshoe-nails cannot be made a trademark, and the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to relief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The Putnam Nail Company brought a bill in equity, which
was afterward amended, against Dulaney, wherein it was set
forth as follows:
The complainant had long manufactured
horseshoe-nails, whose excellence had acquired a market and
a name. With the sole intention of distinguishing a certain
grade of these nails at sight, it adopted, about 1874, a method of
bronzing this grade, and the nails were widely sold under sundry
names, all containing the word " bronze " or "bronzed."
No method of bronzing horseshoe-nails had ever been known
until the complainant originated it, and the bronzing was not
intended to effect, nor did it effect, the intrinsic value of the
nails, but only gave them a conspicuous appearance, so that
it was easy for purchasers to pick them out. This means of
identification had been continuous, extensive, convenient and
profitable, guiding customers throughout the United States.
The defendant was aware of the convenience and profit attending
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the complainant's unique custom of bronzing horseshoe-nails
and using the words "bronze" or "bronzed" in connection
with them in the trade, and was still so doing. This device
was adopted by the defendant, solely for the purpose of simuating the goods of the complainant, and not for any purposes of
utility, and with the intention of filching customers away from
the complainant, by passing off his inferior goods upon deceived
purchasers. Its adoption by the defendant was calculated to
deceive, and did deceive the public, who bought the defendant's
nails, being led by their similar appearance to suppose they.
were those of the complainant's. The defendant adopted and"
used the complainant's device in fraud of the complainant's
right and to the great injury of his business.
Wherefore the complainant prayed for an injunction to restrain
the defendant from bronzing his nails, and for an account, etc.
The defendant demurred to this bill, because a method of
bronzing a certain kind or quality of horseshoe-nails, and the
use of the words " bronze" or" bronzed" in connection therewith, is not a trade-mark, and therefore complainant could acquire no property-right therein as a trade-mark, and because no
ground of fraud on the public was alleged, except the fact that
the defendant bronzed and sold horseshoe-nails, and this was
no fraud, as he had a right so to do.
The Court below sustained the demurrer, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the degree of the Court below in the following
decision by Paxson, C. J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

PAxsoN, C. J. The Court below sustained the defendant's
demurrer and dismissed the plaintiffs' bill. It was evidently
intended as a trade-mark bill, yet the case lacks every element
of a trade-mark. There is no trade-mark shown or alleged
which it is charged the defendant has pirated. On the contrary, the bill alleges that the plaintiffs manufacture a peculiar
kind of horseshoe-nail. It is known to the trade as a bronzed
nail, being covered with a coating of bronze. It is not alleged
that they are any better for being bronzed, but they are more
popular and sell more readily. The bill charges that the defendant is selling a precisely similar nail; that it is bronzed
like those of plaintiffs' to deceive purchasers, and induce them
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to purchase them as plaintiffs' nails. The defendant has not
imitated their label, for they have none. He has not even imitated the plaintiffs' manner or style of putting up their packages; there is nothing beyond the mere averment that he makes
a similar nail. We have never yet carried the doctrine of
trade-marks to the extent claimed for it by the plaintiffs. We
have never hesitated to restrain the imitation of a trade-mark
where the facts justified it. We are now asked to go one step
further and protect the manufacture of the article itself. This
we do not see our way clear to do. The manufacture of a particular article can only be protected by a patent. The law in
regard to trade-marks should not be pushed to the extent of
interfering with manufactures. A man may make any article
that he please that is not protected by a patent. He may make
a horseshoe-nail or any other unpatented article precisely like
that of any other manufacturer; he may imitate it so perfectly
that the one may be mistaken for the other, but he may not
sell his own article as and for that of another by means of a
trade-mark in imitation of the trade-mark of such other person.
Some of the cases cited go so far as to restrain one manufacturer froih imitating the style, form and size of the packages of
other manufacturers. We need not discuss these cases, as they
are not applicable. Our attention has not been called to any
case which is authority for plaintiffs' claim.
We think judgment was properly entered for the defendant
upon the demurrer.
The degree is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed at the cost
of the appellants.

Sufirebie Court of Pennsylvania.
HOYT v. HOYT.
SYLLABUS.
Where a name, style of label, style of package, etc., incapable of becoming technical trade-marks, are adopted by a man to distinguish his

goods from similar goods of other people, the use of this name by a person otherwise entitled to it, and the imitation of the labels, packages,
etc., for the purpose of deceiving purchasers and passing off his goods as
those of the first man's, will not be restrained by a Court of Equity.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff, whose name was Hoyt, had manufactured cologne for many
years and obtained a reputation for it. To distinguish from the cologne
of other manufacturers he called it "Hoyt's German Cologne," and used
certain distinctive labels, packages, etc., in connection with it.
Defendant, whose name was also Hoyt, and who also manufactured
cologne, called his cologne "Hoyt's Egyptian Cologne," and imitated
plaintiff's labels, packages, etc., to take advantage of plaintiff's reputaOtion, deceive purchasers, and pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff.
Held: The plaintiff had no exclusive right to the use of the word
"Hoyt's;" that the word was not a trade-mark; that the distinctive labels, packages, :etc., were not trade-marks, and therefore the plaintiff was
not entitled to relief.
STATUDIENT OF THE CASE.

This was a bill in equity, brought by E. W. Hoyt & Co.
against F. Hoyt & Co., praying for an injunction and an account. The complainants' bill averred that the plaintiffs had
been engaged since 1870 in making and selling cologne under
the name of "Hoyt's German Cologne," and had designed
three sizes of bottles for this cologne, calling them large, medium and trial size; that in 1871 they had originated a cap
label for the top of the bottle, and a paper label for the body of
the bottle, which labels with the bottles were their exclusive
trade-marks, and the word "Hoyt's" their exclusive trade
name; that the plaintiffs had been the first to use the name
"Hoyt's" as applied to cologne; had always been associated
in the public mind with the plaintiffs' cologne, and that the
use of that name upon cologne by another would tend to mislead and deceive the public and be a fraud on the plaintiffs;
that in 1871 the plaintiffs had copyrighted their said face
label, and in 1877 received a certificate of the registry in the
Patent Office of the United States of the said label and trademark.
That in 1885 the plaintiffs learned that the defendants, who
were manufacturers of cologne in Philadelphia, had been exposing for sale cologne called "Hoyt's Egyptian Cologne," in
three sizes, and also a size called "Hoyt's Aline Cologne,"
with labels similar to the plaintiffs', likely to mislead purchasers and induce them to believe the same was the plaintiffs'
cologne. That the defendants, by selling cologne under trademarks similar to the plaintiffs', had injured them and deprived
them of sales and profits.
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The plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from selling any cologne in bottles with
labels and caps as described; from using the caps and labels
described as plaintiffs' labels, and from imitating the trademarks, bottle-caps, advertisements and packages used by the
plaintiffs, and from the use of the word " Hoyt's" on all labels
and advertisements of every form in connection with the sale
and manufacture of cologne.
The defendants' answer set forth that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to equitable relief because they were guilty of deception and misrepresentation in offering their cologne as German
cologne when it was. an American production; that in 1876
-one of the defendants had adopted a trade-mark, which was
duly registered, and denied the allegations of the plaintiffs' bills.
Affidavits were filed by both sides, and a motion was then
made by the plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction on bill,
answer and affadavits; and the Court, Thayer, P. J., entered a
decree restraining the defendants from the use of bottles or cap
labels on bottles resembling in shape and general appearance
the plaintiffs' bottles as described in the bill.
The case was then referred to an examiner and master, who
found, as a matter of fact, that there was no cologne of foreign
manufacture known to the trade and public under the designation of German Cologne; that the plaintiffs had, by their
energy, industry and liberal expenditure of money, secured a
large sale in the United States of cologne of their own manufacture, put up in bottles of their own devising and of peculiar
shape, with labels printed in an original combination of colors,
packed in a distinctive manner, sold under the name of
"Hoyt's German Cologne," and known in the trade by that
name, and also by the name of "Hoyt's Cologne."
That the defendants had been and were manufacturing and
selling cologne, and had intentionally imitated the plaintiffs'
bottles, labels and method of packing, and had thereby put
themselves in the position of selling as goods of the plaintiffs'
manufacture goods which were really of their own manufactture, and they had thereby appropriated to themselves the
benefit of the plaintiffs' advertising and business reputation.
Upon this state of facts the Master decided as a matter of
law that there was no just inference of fraudulent intent on the
part of the plaintiffs in the use of the word "German" on their
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labels designating their cologne as "Hoyt's German Cologne,"
particularly since the plaintiffs put their name and the place of
manufacture upon the bottles they used, and that therefore the
plaintiffs were not to be denied equitable relief if otherwise entitled to it. And held that the following general doctrine as
stated by the Langdale, M. R., in Perry v. Truefill (6 Beav.
66), applied to the case: " A man is not to sell his own goods
under the pretext that they are the goods of another man : he
cannot be permitted to practise such a deception, nor to use
the means which contribute to that end. He cannot, therefore, be allowed to use names. marks, letters or other indicia,
by which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods
which he is selling are the manufacture of another person."
The Master decreed (I) That a writ of injunction issue restraining the defendants and their agents and servants from
putting up, selling, exposing or offering for sale, cologne insuch botttles as were in the plaintiffs' bill, described as the
plaintiffs' bottles, with cap labels or front labels as described
in the plaintiffs' bill or otherwise imitative of the plaintiffs'
labels. (2) That a writ of injunction issue restraining the defendants, their agents and servants, from issuing the word "Hoyt's"
as the initial word of the description of their cologne upon
any advertisement, label or bottle of any cologne offered or
exposed for sale by them. (3) That a writ of injunction issue
restraining the defendants, their agents and servants, from putting up, or selling or offering for sale, cologne in any boxes or
bottles, or with any 'labels simulating or imitating the plaintiffs' bottles, boxes or labels. (4) That an account be taken of
the defendants' sales of cologne as made in boxes or bottles or
with labels imitating the plaintiffs' boxes, bottles and labels,
and the defendants are thereby ordered to pay to the plaintiffs
such sums of money as by the said account shall be found to
be due and payable by them.
The defendants took exceptions to the Master's decree, but
the Court below affirmed the decree.
The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court, which,
in the following opinion by WILLIAMS, J., dismissed the bill at
the cost of the appellees, as no ground of equitable relief appeared on the face of the record.
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The cases in which a Court of Equity will interfere to protect
a trade-mark are divisible into two classes. To the first of
these may be referred those cases in which the trade-mark has
been registered under a system provided by law for the protection of the owner in its use. To the other belong all those
cases in which there has been no registration, and in which the
true ground for interference is the prevention of fraud. In
cases falling within the first class, property in the trade-mark
is shown by the certificate of registration. In those belonging
to the second, the right asserted is of common-law origin, and
is shown by proof of the adoption and use of the trade-mark..
Its invasion is.a fraud upon the owner and the public, to be restrained on principles of common right. All monopolies are
odious, and their maintenance in favor even of inventors is
limited in duration. When a statutory term of protection is
over, whatever is valuable in the subject of the patent becomes,
as does an unpatented invention, a contribution to the public
welfare and may be freely used as such. Competition is essential to commerce, and within legitimate lines should always be
encouraged. The "survival of the fittest" is a law of trade
no less than of the development of living organisms; and from
the struggle which determines who and what is " fittest" come
general development and progress. As a general proposition,
it may be said that one may imitate what is excellent in the
processes and business methods of his neighbor as freely and
as safely as he may imitate what is good in his moral character
as long as he infringes no right secured to him by statute, and
does not fraudulently personate him or simulate his products.
An inventor who secures a patent for his device is protected in
his exclusive right during the period fixed by law. When
that period expires his exclusive right expires with it, and
thereafter he stands on no higher ground than any other
citizen who may desire to use the thing or combination covered by the patent. The rules applicable to trade-marks are
quite different. A trade-mark may increase in value to its
owners by use, and the law could not put a time limit on the
owner's right to it any more than it could put a limit upon his
right to use any other article or property. A trade-mark is
not an invention. It does not relate to or affect processes of
manufacture or mechanical combinations. It is a sign or mark
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by which the manufactured articles produced by one person or
firm or maker are distinguishable from those produced by
rival manufacturers. It must be distinctive and indicate the
personal as distinguished from the geographical origin of the
article to which it is applied: Langhman's Appeal, 128 Pa. I.
Thus Sonman, the name of a large tract of land, cannot be appropriated by one of several owners of land within the tract, to
the exclusion of the other owners; nor Lackawanna Valley,
by one operator in that valley, to the exclusion of all others.
But the trade-mark must relate to and distinguish the goods to
which it is applied. For this reason, among others, the size
or shape or mode of construction of a box, barrel, bottle, or
package in which goods may be put is not a trade-mark. If
there is any new and useful combination in the construction of
such box or package it should be patented as an invention, if
the owner wishes to prevent others from using it; but such
package cannot be registered as a trade-mark. A sign, devise
or mark originated and in actual use by another cannot be
adopted and registered by any one who takes a fancy to it as
his trade-mark, and such adoption and registration will not
confer a title on him who makes it. It would be an infringement upon the original owner, and from the wrong so done no
valid title could grow. A trade namiie may, in a general way,
be treated as a trade-mark and protected in the same manner.
When a business has been conducted by some person or firm
under a particular trade name until the public come to regard
the name as affording an assurance of the good quality of the
article bearing it, the name is a valuable part of the business
assets of the person or firm whose skill and integrity have won
confidence for it. A rival who should appropriate the trade
name to his own use without the consent of the owners, and
put his goods on the market bearing it, as though they were
made by the rightful owner of the trade name, is guilty of a
fraud on the public, and a fraudulent taking from the proprietor. which is, both in intent and effect, -a larceny.
But when such rival puts his goods on the market on their
own merits and under his trade name, his neighbors have no
just ground of complaint if he has imitated, adopted, or improved upon their unpatented methods and processes: Putnam
Nail Co. v. Dzulaney, decided at the present term. It only remains to apply these general principles to the case now before
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us, so far as they are applicable to the questions raised by the
appeal of the defendant below. The plaintiffs claim that the
front or face label on their bottles has been registered by them
as a trade-mark. It is put on obliquely to the length of the
bottle. It bears the name of the liquid in the bottle thus,
It also bears the name and resi"H -Hoyt'sGerman Cologne."
dence of the makers, and a reference to the fact of its registration. They also claim the following unregistered trade-marks:
a bottle having a depression or panel on the back side; a cap
label over the cork in the bottle; a peculiar mode of arranging
and packing bottles in boxes; in the name of the article sold,
viz., " Hoyt's German Cologne."
The defendants have a registered label or trade-mark which
goes upon the bottle at right angles witli its length, and which
contains the name of the liquid, "Hoyt's Egyptian Cologne,"
with a view of a pyramid and the head of the sphinx; with
the names and residence of the makers, and a reference to its
registration. The learned Judge of the Court below held that
F. Hoyt, of the defendant firm, had a legal right to use his
own name in his business, and that he could not be enjoined
from using it upon goods produced by himself. The correctness of this holding is not raised by the defendants' appeal.
The learned Judge also held that the defendants' trade-mark or
label was not an infringement upon that of the plaintiffs',
whether considered by itself or in connection with the champagne-shaped bottles on which it was originally used by the defendants. This also must be regarded as settled for the purposes of this appeal, since the plaintiffs have not appealed, and
the defendants cannot, from this ruling. Then, too, the evidence shows very clearly that the bottle with the depression or
panel on the back side, which both parties are now using, is a
stock bottle to which neither of them has any exclusive right,
and which is freely sold by manufacturers to all who apply.
This bottle, as we have already seen, is not a trade-mark.
It is not registered, and it is not capable of registration. It is
in common use, open to the purchase and use of all who may
fancy its shape, in the same manner as the other stock bottles.
The cap labelwas not originated by the ilaintiffs, and does not belong to them. It was devised, accordingto the uncontradictedtlestimony, by Dr. DavidJayne, a Philadelbhiachemist and dealer in
medicines, and was used by him and his successorsfor years before
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and since the plaintiffs assumed to adopt it as their own. Their
adofition of his cap labelgave them no title to it. The mechan-

ical arrangement of the bottles in boxes is neither an invention
nor a trade-mark. If the box is an invention, and others are
to be prevented from using it, the plaintiffs should have secured
a patent for it. Without letters patent they have no exclusive
property in the shape or construction of a box. Whatever one
manufacturer or tradesman may do to increase the safety of'
his goods in transportation, or to display them advantageously
upon shelves, counters, or in show windows, is simply a good
example or model for the public which any ohe interested may
imitate with impunity. The debatable ground presented by
this appeal is thus seen to be very narrow. It may be learned.
to the best advantage by considering the language of the Court
below and the form of the decree made. The decree did not
hold the defendants' label to be an infringement, or deny the
defendants the use of their name. On the contrary, the
learned Judge said, "The defendants have also, we think, the
right to use the label placed on the sides of their bottles."
If they made cologne and sold in bottles such as they used
at first, with their labels upon them having the name "Hoyt's
Egyptian Cologne," and the pyramid and the head of the sphinx,
and the names and residence of the makers, they were exercising a clear legal right and could not be enjoined. "But,"
the decree continues, "'the defendants must be enjoined from
putting up and offering for sale cologne in the bottles described
in the bill, with the labels thereon." This is the decree appealed from. The Court held that the defendants' label was
no infringement, and was lawfully used on a stock bottle with
a champagne-bottle shape. But if the same label was used on
another stock bottle having a panel on the back side, it became
an infringement because of the shape of the bottle on which it
was placed, and the use of the label on such a bottle must be
prevented by injunction. As both styles of bottle were open
to the public as stock bottles, the label was as lawful upon
one of them as upon the other. The plaintiffs could no more
acquire an exclusive right to a stock bottle by priority of use
than they could acquire an exclusive right to Dr. Jayne's cap
label by being the first to appropriate it without his knowledge or
consent. Adopting the conclusions of the learned Judge, that
the label of the defendants did not infringe upon that of the
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plaintiffs, and that the defendants had a legal right to use their
own names in their business, we cannot sustain this decree.
It is accordingly set aside; and as no ground of equitable
relief appears upon the record before us, the bill is dismissed at
the cost of the appellees.
The facts in these two cases,
though differing somewhat, are
such that the same principles apply
to them both. In each case the
bill claimed not only a trade-mark
for the plaintiffs and an infringement of it by the defendants, but
furtheraverred an imitation, by the
defendants, of certain distinctive
marks, etc., whether trade-marks
or not, used by the plaintiffs to distinguish their goods, with the intention, on the part of the defendants,
of deceiving the public and purchasers, and inducing them to believe that the defendants' goods
were the plaintiffs', and in one case
that purchasers had thereby in fact
been deceived, and in the other case
that the plaintiffs were thereby deprived of sales and profits. In the
first case the defendants admitted
the facts averred in the bill by demurring to it, and in the second
case the Master and the Court below
found the facts as stated in the bill
to be true. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in the first case decided that the plaintiff had not a
good trade-mark, and in the second
that the registered trade-mark had
not been infringed, and in both
cases, totally ignoring the imitation
by the defendants of the marks,
labels, etc., adopted by the plaintiffs
to distinguish their goods, dismissed the bills.
It is thought that an examination
of the cases will show the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in so
deciding, failed to recognize a principle that is clearly laid down and
followed by the English Courts,
the Supreme Court of the United

States, and the Courts of last resort
of many of the States.
A trade mark is " a symbol, emblem, or mark, which a tradesman
puts upon or attaches in some way
to the goods he manufactures, or
has caused to be manufactured, so
that they may be identified and
known in the market " (Bonvier's
Law Dictionary).
This is a trade-mark in its broad
sense. In its narrower or technical
sense, and it will be used in this
sense in this discussion, there are
certain limitations in determining
what can be made a trade-mark,
for not every symbol, emblem or
mark can be taken as a trade-mark.
In certain cases, though a man
was the first one to use the mark,
others have as good a right to
it as he, and he cannot appropriate it exclusively to himself.
A man cannot use his own name as
a trade-mark for his goods (Brown
on Trade Marks, 2o6), nor can ie
adopt a name descriptive of natural
objects as such (Laughman's Appeal, 128 Pa. i), and there are certain other limitations as to what
may be adopted for a trade-mark.
Where the descriptive emblem,
symbol or mark is such as to be
a technical trade-mark, its owner
can have it registered, and has an
absolute possessory right to it as
against the world, and any infringement of such a trade-mark, whether
frandaleut or not, will be restrained.
If the law of trade-marks were
limited to technical trade-marks,
there would often be great injustice
done. A. has adopted, we will

THE LAW RELATING TO UNFAIR COMPETITION.

suppose, a device or mark of such
a nature that it cannot be made a
trade-mark; his goods are of a
superior quality, and purchasers
prefer them to the goods of other
manufacturers, and in making purchases look out for A. 's distinctive
device or mark. B. imitates A.'s
device or mark for the purpose of
deceiving purchasers and passing
off his goods as A.'s. B. has just
as good a right to the use of the
device or mark as A., except for the
fact that A. has established a reputation for his goods and has used
the device or mark to distinguish
them from the goods of other
manufacturers; yet there would
here be a clear fraud upon A. and
those who desired to purchase his
goods if B. were allowed to pass
off in this way his goods for the
goods of A.
To prevent such a fraud, a principle of law has been developed
called the law of cases "analogous
to trade-marks."
The gist of this doctrine is not
the infringement of a trade-markfor the device or mark imitated is
not capable of becoming a trademark-but is the fraudulent imitation by one man of some distinctive device or mark adopted by
another to distinguish his goods
from other goods of the same character. The principle that applies
in such cases is very clearly and
forcibly laid down by Lord Langdale in Perry v. Trueflt, 6 Beav.
66: "A man is not to sell his own
goods under the pretext that they
are the goods of another man. He
cannot be permitted to practise
such a deception, nor use the
means which contribute to such an
end."
(See an article on "Cases
Analogous to Trade-Marks" in the
Harvard Law Review for February, 1891, by G. 0. Cushing, Esq.,
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and one on "The Prevention of Unfair Competition in Business" in the
HarvardLaw Review for October,
1891, by Rowland Coxe, Esq., for
excellent treatment of this subject.)
The English cases have recognized
this principle for many years.
In Knott v. lAorgan, 2 Keen 213,
decided in 1836, the plaintiffs, who
ran a line of omnibuses, painted
their ominbuses and clothed their
servants in a special and distinctive
manner, and the defendants began
to run omnibuses painted in the
same manner, with servants similarly clothed.
The defendants
were restrained from imitating the
plaintiffs' line of omnibuses, though
it did not appear that the plaintiffs
had any exclusive right to the style
of painting or clothes imitated.
Per Lord Langdale: "It is not to be
said that the plaintiffs have any
exclusive right to the words ' Conveyance Company,' or 'London
Conveyance Company' or any
other words; but they have a right
to call upon this Court to restrain
the defendants from fraudulently
using precisely the same words and
devices which they have taken for
the purpose of distinguishing their
property, and therefore depriving
them of the fair profits of their
business by attracting customers
upon false representation that the
carriages (really the defendants')
belonged to, and are under, the
management of the plaintiffs."
In Perry v. Truefitl, 6 Beav. 66,
the plaintiff was the compounder
of "Perry's Medicated Mexican
Balm," and the defendant was restrained from calling another compound under the name of "Truefitt's Medicated Mexican Balm."
Per Lord Langdale: "I own it does
not seem to me that a man can
acquire property merely in a name
or a mark ; but whether he has or
has not a property in the name or
mark, I have no doubt that another
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person has not a right to use that
name or mark for the purpose of
description."
In Crofl v. Day, Beav. 84, the
plaintiffs, executors of the surviving partner of the firm of Day &
Martin, of 97 High Holborn, sold
blacking hade by them in bottles
labelled with the name and address
of the firm.
The defendants,
who obtained the authority of a
man named Martin to use his
name, and sold blacking in bottles with the name and address
"Day & Martin, 9oy2 Holborn
Hill," in imitation of the genuine
labels, was restrained from using labels or show cards calculated to produce deception. In Lee v. Haley,
L. R. 5 Ch. 155, the plaintiffs, under
the name of the "Guinea Coal
Company," sold coal at 22 Pall
Mall. The defendant, a former
manager, started to sell coal at
number 46 Pall Mall uuder the
name of the "Pall Mall Guinea
Coal Company," but was restrained
from trading under that name in
Pall Mall.
Per Gifford, L. J.: "I quite agree
that the plaintiffs have no property
in the name (Guinea Coal Company), but the principle upon which
cases upon thissubjectproceedisnot
that there is a property in the word,
but that it was a fraud on a person
who has established a trade and
carries it on under a given name,
that some other person should assume the same name, or the same
with a slight alteration, in such a
way as to induce persons to deal
with him under the belief that they
are dealing with the person who is
given the reputation of the name."
In Siegert v. Findlate-, Chan.
Div. 8ol, the plaintiff manufactured
at Angostura a liquid which he
called "Angostura Bitters." The defendant began to make another
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preparation which he called "Angostura Bitters" and sold in bottles
like the defendant's. Heldthat the
defendant had acted in a manner
intended and calculated to deceive
and which had deceived; and he
was restrained from using the word
"Angostura" or the words "Augostura Bitters " in such a way as to
be calculated to deceive.
In Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v.
AMassam, 42 L. T. N. S. 851, and
Lever v.Goodwin, L. R. 36 Ch. Div.
i, and Afibner v. Reed, Cox's Man.
T. M. C. 328, the same principle is
recognized and followed.
In Walkerv. Alley, 13 Grant Up.
Can. Ch. 366, the plaintiff had established a dry-goods house under the
sign and name of the "Golden
Lion," and the defendant began a
similiar business under the same
name and sign. The Court granted
an injunction andsaid: "Youhave
your choice of many signs which,
as a mere attraction or to give your
store a marked designation, must
answer a fair business purpose
equally well." See also W~olf v.
Hart, 4 Victoria L. R. Eq. 125.
Fiu'ally, two late English cases
emphasize strongly the principle of
equitable relief in ases entirely outside of technical trade-marks where
there has been fraud. In the
earlier one, Wilherspioon v. Carrie,
L. R. 5 H. L. So8, the plaintiffs
made starch at Glenfield which
obtained a reputation under the
name of" Glenfield Starch." Subsequently the defendants moved to
Glenfield and made starch which
they sold as " Glenfield Starch."
Although the starch was made in
Glenfield, the defendants were
restrained from calling it Glenfield
Starch, as doing so would be calculated to produce in the mind of
purchasers the belief that it was the
plaintiffs' article.
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So also in Thompson v. Montgomery, L. R. 41 Ch. D. 35, the
plaintiffs had a brewery at Stone,
and called their ale "Stone Ale."
The term became well known in
the market, and the plaintiffs sought
to prevent the defendant calling his
ale "Stone Ale," though in point
of fact it was made at Stone. The
Court said: "The plaintiffs' rights
are to prevent anybody from passing off their goods as the goods of
the plaintiffs'. The defendant says
that the plaintiffs have no exclusive right to the use of the
words "Stone Ale" alone. Perhaps not, as against the word. He
says that the plaintiffs have not any
right to prevent the defendant's
selling his goods as having been
made at Stone : I am not prepared
But as
to say that they have.
against a particular defendant who
is fraudulently using, or going to
fraudulently use, the words with
the express purpose of pas~ing off
his goods as the goods of the plaintiff, it appears to me that the plaintiffmayhave rights." Theinjunction was accordingly made perpetual.
Turning now to the American
cases, we find the same principle
followed, time and time again, in
Federal and State Courts.
In Enoch Mforgan's Sons Co.
v. Schwachofer, 5 Abbott's New
Cases 265, the plaintiffs were manufacturers of a soap which they
called " Sapolia" and wrapped in
silver foil with a blue band. The
defendants manufactured a similar
soap which they called "Saphia,"
also using a silver foil and a blue
band for the packages. An injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from using wrappers so
closely resembling the plaintiffs',
the Court saying:
" I am, therefore, of the opinion
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that the plaintiffs are entitled to an
injunction restraining the defendant from vending 'Saphia' in
the blue packages in which it was
sold. By this I do not mean to be
understood as holding that the defendant has not the right to manufacture, and also to sell, 'Saphia,'
nor to restrain him from the use of
that name, or the figure or device
upon the label, but I do intend that
he shall abstain from dressing his
goods in wrappers so closely resembling the plaintiffs' as to enable him to deceive the public and
perpetuate fraud. In other words,
he must sell under his own colors,
and not under those of the plaintiffs'."
See also Williamson v. Johnson,
2 Bosw. ; Gillott v. Esterbrook, 48
N. Y. 374.
In Mforgan's Sons Co. v. Troxell
et al., Cox's Man. T. M. C. 674,
Barrett, J., says: "'Are the defendants, not in words, but by acts and
by something on the face of the articles, representing their goods as
being the goods of the plaintiffs?
• . . The law does not limit the
form of the pretence; that depends
upon the facts of each particular
case."
And an injunction was
granted.
In the Southern White Lead Co.
v. Carey et al., 0. G. U. S. Patent
Office, Vol. 33, p. 624, Gresham, J.,
says: "I shall not stop to inquire
whether the complainants' claim
to the trade-marks is or is not well
founded, as I think it is entitled to
an injunction on another ground.
The defendants so brand the heads
of their casks as to naturally mislead, and induce persons purchasing for consumption to suppose
that they are purchasing complainants' lead, when they are getting an inferior article. . . . The
defendants manufacture their adul-
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terated and greatly inferior lead at
Chicago, and stamp upon their
casks a false brand in imitation of
Why
the complainants' brand.
is this done, unless it be in the
hope of deceiving the public and
injuring the complainants?" And
an injunction was granted.
In Trask Fish Co. v. Wooster,
28 Mo. App. 4o8, an injunction
was granted on the same grounds.
InAvery& Sons v. 1eikle_" Co.,
81 Ky. 73, the plaintiffs manufactured ploughs in the city of Louisville, and branded the ploughs of
the steel series "Pony," "AO,"
"BO" and "CO," and those of the
' ..' I,'"' 2,''" 3"
cast series '"
The defendants also
and "8."
manufactured ploughs in Louisville, and branded their steel series
"PO," "AO," " BO " and CO," and
1,"" "2,"
their cast series "
"'3" and "8.'
The Court held that there was no
trade-mark here, but enjoined the
defendants from the use of the
plaintiffs' marks on the ground of
fraud.
See also Melcalf v. Brand, 86
Ken. 346.
In Woodward v. Lazar, 2E Cal.
448, the defendant called his hotel
the "What Cheer House," built
another across the way, which he
also called the "What Cheer
House," and sold the first to the
defendant, who put up a sign,
"The Original What Cheer House."I
Although the defendant's sign was
true, he was enjoined from its use.
In the Royal Baking Powder Co.
v. Jenkins et al., Price & Stewart
Amer. T. M. Cases 309, the defendant used the word "Royalty" in
connection with his baking powder, and imitated the boxes and
labels of the plaintiff. An injunction was granted.

See also Alexander v. Mforse, 14
R. I. 153; Neff & Co. v. Radam,
77 Texas 530; Howard v. Ienriques, 3 Sand. N. Y. 725.
In New York Cab Compfany v.
77ooney, 15 Abbott N. C. 152, the
plaintiffs painted the lower body of
its cabs yellow, and painted on the
upper panel a crown with three
feathers issuing out of it, encircled
by a gold band bearing its name
"New York Cab Company, Limited." The defendant painted his
cabs the same color, and upon the
upper panel painted a device, consisting of a gold band without
feathers, containing the words
"New York Cab, Limited." The
defendant was restrained her e.
See also Cooke v. Slarkweather.
13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392.
In Hierce v. Guillard,68 Cal. 68.
the plaintiffmanufactured an article
called "German Sweet Chocolate."
The defendant called his goods
"Sweet German Chocolate" for the
purpose of deceiving and securing
the plaintiff's customers. The defendant was enjoined from the use
of the words "Sweet German Chocolate," and this without reference to
the question whether the plaintiff's
label constituted a trade-mark. See
also Lea v. o/[f, 3 Abb. N. S. 389.
In Collon v. Thomas, 2 Brewster
308, the plaintiff practised as a dentist under the name of the "Colton
Dental Association." The defendant, who had been in his employ,
put up a sign reading "Dr. F. R.
Thomas, late operator at the Colton
Dental Rooms," the words "late
operator" being in very small letters. The defendant was enjoined
from using such signs and words as
represented his place of business
See also
to be the plaintiff's.
Saunders v. Jacobus, Mo. App. 96.
In the A m e rican lValtham
lWatch Co. v. The United States
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Watch Co., Harvard Law Review,
Feb., 189i, both plaintiff and defendant made watches at Waltham,
the plaintiff having done so for
many years, the defendant for but
a short time.
The evidence proved to the Court
that the defendants were trying unfairly to obtain the benefit of the
plaintiff's reputation,and an injunction was granted against the use of
the words "Waltham Watches" or
"Waltham Watch" alone or in
combination.
See also Blue Store Clothing
House case in the same Review.
The decisions of the Federal Courts
are in line with the decisions above.
As long ago as 1844 Judge Story,
though not drawing the distinction
between trade-marks and cases analogous to them, granted relief in a
case of the latter class: Taylor v.
Carpenter,3 Story 458.
The defendant had -imitated the
plaintiff's spools by coloring, stamping and labelling them in the same
way the plaintiff had done, and had
enclosed them in envelopes similar
to the plaintiff's.
Judge Story granted an injunction
to restrain the defendant from this
imitation, and said, p. 463: "The
case presented is one of unmitigated
and designed infringement of the
rights of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of defrauding the public, and
taking from the plaintiffs the fair
earnings of their skill, labor and enterprise."
In Sawyer v. Home, i Fed. Rep.
24, the Court says: "But we do find
that the respondent has been guilty
of improper and inequitable conduct, to the injury of the complainant, in having designedly so put up,
labelled, and packed his goods that
purchasers, for whose use they are
intended, are misled and deceived,
and do get Home's blue, when they

desire and suppose they are getting
Sawyer's; and that Sawyer, the
complainant, having, after many
years of manufacture, established a
market and a demand for his goods
as known by their peculiar and
distinctive appearance, 'which he
was the first to adopt, is now deprived of profits which he would
otherwise obtain, by the fact that
after he had so established a reputation and demand for his goods,
the defendant,.with the intention
of getting the benefit of that reputation and demand, has put his
goods on the market, prepared with
such close imitation of the complainant's that they are mistaken
for his. . . . What we decide is
that whether the complainant has
a trade-mark or not, as he was the
first to put up bluing for sale, in
peculiarly shaped and labelled
boxes adopted by him, and as
his goods have become known
to purchasers and are bought as
the goods of the complainant by
reason of their peculiar shape,
color or label, no person has
the right to use the complainant's form of package, color or
label, or any imitation thereof, in
such manner as to mislead purchasers into buying his goods for
those of the complainant, whether
they be better or worse in quality."
In Hostetter et at. v. Adams et
al., io Fed. Rep. 838, the facts were
very similar, and here again equitable relief was granted, though
there was no trade-mark. See also
CarbolicSoafi Company v. ThompSOn, 25 Fed. Rep. 625; Royal Baking Powder Company v. John
Davis el al., 26 Fed. Rep. 293;
Sawyer Crystal Blue Compiany v.
Hubbard,32 Fed. Rep. 388.
In M oie Nerve Food v. Bantubach, 32 Fed. Rep. 205, the plain-
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tiff manufactured a beverage which
he called "Moxie Nerve Food"
and put it up in champagne bottles.
The defendant was enjoined from
using champagne bottles in connection with the term "Standard
Nerve Food" for preparations similar in taste, color and flavor to the
plaintiff's preparation.
See also
M ro.ie Nerve Food Co. v. Beach,
33 Fed. Rep.' 248; Jennings v.
Johnson, 37 Fed. Rep. 364; M1fyers
v. Thalle, 38 Fed. Rep. 607;
Fresev. Bachof; 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz.
635. Finally in Putnam Nail Co.
v. Bennett & Stubbs, 43 Fed. Rep.
Soo, the plaintiff, the facts and the
bill were the same as in Putnamz
ail Co. v. Dulaney, at present
under discussion; and the Circuit
Court, in an oral opinion by Bradley, Circuit Justice, dismissed the
demurrer to the bill. Chief Justice
Fuller, in the very recent case of
Lawrence Afanufacturing Co. v.
Tennessee Mlanufacturing Co., 138
U. S. 537, cited this case with approval.
The Supreme Court ofthe United
States has laid down and followed
the same principle.
In AfacLean v. Fleming, 96 U.
S. 245, the plaintiff called pills
made by him "Dr. C. iacLean's
Celebrated Liver Pills," and used
certain distinctive labels and wrappers for them, and the defendant
was restrained from calling his pills
"Dr. J. H. McLean's Universal
Pills or Vegetable Liver Pills" or
"Dr. McLean's Universal Pills"
upon any label or wrapper for boxes
or other packages ofpills, resembling or in imitation of the labels
or wrappers or trade-marks ( trademarks is here used in its broad
sense) of the complainant. Clifford, J., said, p. 254: "Nor is it
necessary, in order to give a right
to an injunction, that a specific
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trade-mark should be infringed;
but it is sufficient that the Court is
satisfied that there was an intent
on the part of the respondent to
palm off his goods as the goods of
the complainant, and thathe persists in so doing after being requested to desist."
In Lawrence Manufacturing Co.
v. Tennessee M1anufacturing Co.,
138 U. S. 537, Fuller, C. J., says, p.
549:
"Undoubtedly an unfair and
fraudulent competition against the
business of the plaintiff, conducted
with the intent, on the part of the
defendant, to avail himself of the
reputation of the plaintiff to palm
off his goods as plaintiffs, would,
in a proper case, constitute a
ground for relief, " and then cites
Putnam Nail Co. v. Bennett, supra,
with approval.
So much for the cases. Sabastian on Trade-marks, p. 271, lays
down very 6learly the underlying
principle: "'Where, however, there
has been a representation that one
thing is another, by means of
which one person has secured custom intended for another, so that
both the purchaser and genuine
trader have been defrauded, there
the Court -will interfere and protect
the right of both parties to trade
freely without fraudulent deceptions, although the fraud has taken
another form than that of imitating
a trade-mark. "
Do these cases and the principle
on which they are decided apply to
the two Pennsylvania cases at present under discussion ?
It is the purpose of this article to
show, if possible, that they do. In
Putnam Nail Co. v. Dulaney, to
take the cases up one at a time,
the bill averred that the plaintiff
bronzed certain nails made by it,
that this bronzing did not make
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the nails intrinsically any better.
but was done so that purchasers
could distinguish its nails readily
at sight; that the defendant had
imitated this bronzing for the purpose of filching purchasers from
the plaintiff; and that, in fact,
purchasers had been deceived by the
imitation. The Court, in a learned
opinion by Paxson, Chief Justice, says that there is no valid
trade-mark here, and hence no
rights of the plaintiff have been
infringed. Perhaps there was no
infringement of a trade-mark; but
neither was there in the cases cited
above, in which the Courts over
and over again granted relief, for
the simple reason that the defendants had fraudulently imitated
certain distinctive marks, etc.,
which the plaintiffs had adopted,
whereby purchasers had been deceived, so that they had bought
the defendants' goods, thinking
they were the plaintiffs'. The
learned Chief Justice remarks:
"Some of the cases cited go so far
as to restrain one manufacturer
from imitating the style, form and
size of the packages of other manufacturers. We need not discuss
these cases, for they are not applicable." But why are they not applicable? In these cases the defendants imitated the plaintiffs'
packages to enable them to pass off
their goods as the plaintiffs'. In
the present case the defendant
bronzed his nails for precisely the
same purpose.
It is true that in these cases the
particular imitation of this case, to
wit, bronzing horseshoe-nails, was
not before the Courts, but there is
no intimation in these cases that
relief should be granted only where
style, form and size of packages
are imitated. Relief is not granted
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because any one mark, etc., is imitated, but because the imitation,
on the whole, is such as to confuse
purchasers, and the law is broad
enough to cover all cases in which
this imitation is established. As
Barrett, J., says in Aorgan's Sons
& Co. v. Troxell, Cox's Man. T.
M. Cases, No. 674: "The law does
not limit the form of pretence:
that depends upon the facts of each
particular case."
Why should relief be granted
where part of the imitation restrained consists of painting an
onmibus or cab a particular color,
or using the defendant's own name
in a way to deceive, or using a certain expression or label, box or
package for the same purpose (see
cases cited above), and not where
bronzing nails is the deception ?
It is submitted that the distinction
is one consisting of simply the facts
used to bring about the deception
and not one of principle. The essential elements of the case cited
above - fraudulent imitation and
deception of purchasers-is present in this case. It can make no
possible difference that the imitation is limited to one particular instead of consisting of an imitation
in several particulars.
From the nature of horseshoenails, bronzing them in itself is
enough to deceive purchasers, and
that is sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to relief if deception actually
follows from the bronzing.
If bronzing made the nails intrinsically better, then, inasmuch
as bronzing cannot be patented,
the plaintiffs would have no case;
but the bill specifically avers that
the bronzing does not make the
nails intrinsically more valuable,
so the fact that bronzing cannot be
patented makes no difference.
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The plaintiff in this was clearly
entitled to relief under the cases
cited above, unless to apply the law
of cases analogous to trade-marks
in this particular case would be
carrying the principle too far. The
Circuit Court of the United States,
in Putmnan Nail Co. v. Bennett,
cited with approval by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in
which the facts and bill were
identical with the facts and bill of
the present case (see above), decided that the facts set forth in the
plaintiff's bill entitled it to relicf.
Said Mr. Justice Bradley: "Now, a
trade-mark, clearly such, is in itself
evidence, when wrongfully used by
a third party, of an illegal act. It is
of itself evidence that the party intended to defraud, and palm off his
goods as another's. Whether this
(bronzing nails) is in itself a good
trade-mark or not, it is a style of
goods adopted by the complainants
which the defendants have imitated
for the purpose of deceiving, and
have deceived the public thereby,
and induced them to buy their
goods as the goods of the complainants. This is fraud."
The Court then dismissed the demurrer.
Of course this Circuit Court case
is not a binding precedent for the
State Court; but it would perhaps
have been more satisfactory on the
whole if the State Court had carefully analyzed the reasoning of the
Federal Court, and had triumphantly shown wherein it was erroneous, and then shown wherein its
own reasoning was superior. But
instead of this, the State Court dismissed the plaintiffs' bill in an
opinion in which the doctrine of
cases analogous to trade-marks is
totally ignored, in which not one
case is cited by name, and in
which the Circuit Court case, pre-

sumably, is dismissed with the remark that it is not an authority
binding on the State Court.
The case of Hoyt v. Hot is
even stronger, for here the Court
would not have had to apply the
law of cases analogous to trademarks to a new set of facts, for the
imitation sought to be restrained
in this case was practically identical with that of many cases previously decided.
The plaintiffs'
bill prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from using
the word " Hoyt's" in connection
with the sale and manufacture of
cologne, and from im*itating the
bottle caps, labels, advertisements
and packages used by the plaintiffs.
The Master and Court below
found that "the defendants have
intentionally adopted bottles, labels
and a method of packing to imitate
the plaintiffs' manufacture, and
to induce innocent purchasers to
buy cologne manufactured by the
defendants under the belief that
the cologne that they purchased
has been manufactured by the
plaintiffs," and on this state of facts
g-ranted an injunction to restrain
the defendants from this imitation
and from using the word "Hoyt's"
as the initial word of the description of their cologne. There was
no attempt on the part of the Supreme Court to review the evidence
and prove that it did not support
the Master's finding, so the facts
must be taken as the Master found
them.
In Sawyer v. Homne (see above)
the defendants were restrained from
imitating the packages and labels
of the plaintiff, and in AfcLean v.
Fleming (see above) the defendant
was restrained from the use of a
name to which he had a right, except for the fact that in this case
it was fraudulently used. Many
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of the other cases cited above were
decided upon a similar state of
facts.
In Hoyt v. Hoyt, as in Putnamn
Nail 6o, v. Dulaney, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania refused to
grant the relief prayed for.
It may be well to review the
opinion of the Court.
The learned Judge says: "As a
general proposition, it may be said
that one may imitate what is excellent in the processes and business methods of his neighbor as
freely and safely as he may imitate
whatis good in his moral character,
as long as he infringes no right secured to him by statute, and does
not fraudulently personate him or
The last
simulate his products."
clause-fraudulent simulation of
another's products -seems to recognize the law of cases analogous to
trade-marks, and it would seem
that the present case was 6ne for
its application, because the Master
found that the defendants had intentionally adopted bottles, etc., to
imitate the plaintiffs' manufacture,
and induce purchasers to buy'the
defendants' cologne under the impression that they were buying the
plaintiffs'. But the Court did not
think so, and dismissed the subject
without any attempt to explain
why the fraudulent imitation of
another's goods or products in the
present case should not be restrained. The learned Judge then
takes up the question of trademarks and patents, and says that, as
there is in the case no infringement
of a trade-mark or no patent, the
plaintiff is entitled to no relief.
And what he says would be conclusive if the law did not go beyond
the infringement of a trade-mark or
patent. But, as the cases cited
above abundantly show, the law
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grants relief upon much broader
grounds where there is fraudulent
imitation of another's marks, etc.,
and this principle of relief on
broader grounds the learned Judge
totally ignores in spite of the numerous cases in which relief has been
granted, where the facts were practically identical with those in the
present case. In another part of
the opinion the learned Judge takes
up the question of the use by the
defendants of the word "Hoyt's, "
and cites the opinion of the Court
below to the effect that the defendant had a right to the use of his
own name in his business, and that
he could not be enjoined from using
it on goods produced by himself.
"The correctness of this holding,"
says the opinion, "is not raised by
the defendant's appeal."
The Court has here fallen into a
curious error. It is true that the
Court below held that the defendant had a right to the use of his
own name, and refused to restrain
him from its use. Butthe Courtso
held in an opinion delivered when
the prelimninay injunction was
granted.
The Master, after hearing the
evidence, decreed that the defendants be restrained from using the
word "Hoyt's" as the initial word
of the description of their cologne
upon any advertisement, label or
bottle, and the Court below affirmed
the decree of the Master, and
granted a efyeetual injunction, restraining the defendants from the
use of the word "Hoyt's" under
the circumstances set forth by the
Master. In other words, the learned
Judge cites what the Court below
decided at an early stage of the
case, when in fact the Court finally
decided something entirely differ-.
ent.

OREGON eX rel. BVBR"FT V. BOURNE."
In these two cases the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has totally
ignored the law of cases analogous
to trade-mark-the law which restrains the fraudulent imitation by
one man of the distinctive marks,
etc., adopted by another to distinguish his goods-and that although
this law is firmly established elsewhere by the Courts of highest
authority in England and in this
country. If the Court had discussed this principle of law carefully and shown that an advanced
public policy demanded that the
Pennsylvania Court should refuse
to follow the decisions of the other
Courts, one would sympathize with
its stand. But there is no such
discussion in the opinion in these
cases.
[ "Whether trade rivalry shall be

open and fair,,so that each. may be
stimulated to his best endeavor in
knowledge that his exertions will
bring him to the full the honor
and profit which are his due,
or whether fraud, which knows
how to evade definite'rules, shall
reap the fruits of honest labor
and hardly won reputation, is
within the discretion of the Court:" )
G. D. Cushing, Fsq., in the tHaryard Law Review for Feb., i8gi, p.
332.) It is respectfully submitted
that' in these cases the Pennsylvania Court has misused its discretion and taken a wrong stand, and
that these two decisions are much
to be deplored, for it is difficult to
see how their effect Will not be to
encourage one branch of commercial dishonesty.
WILLIAM WHARTON SMITH.

Suipreme Court of Oregon.

OREGON ex rel. EVERETT

v.

BOURNE.

Decided November 2, 1891.
SYLLABUS.
Where a witness whose testimony is required in a cause pending in a
courtof justice is within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign Court, it
is the duty of the foreign Court, when. properly requested so to do by-the
Court in which the suit is pending, to require the attendance of the witness before a regularly commissioned officer, and there to compel him to
answer such interrogatories as have been propounded.
The jurisdiction of the foreign Court in such cases is based upon that
principle of the law of nations which requires the courts of different
countries -to assist each other for the furtherance of justice, and such
jurisdiction may be exercised independently of local law.
Therefore when a Circuit Court in Oregon, in compliance with letters.
rogatory issued opt of a Superior Court in Massachusetts, ordered the
witnesses designated in the letters to appear before a commissioner, which
order the witness disobeyed:
Held, that the Court below was justified in committing the refractory
witness for contempt, and imprisoning him till he should comply with
the order.

STATEMENT

Ot THE CASE.

The authority to compel attendance being a judicial power is conferred
upon the Circuit Courts by that clause in the Constitution of Oregon (Art.
VIII, See. 9) which vests in the Circuit Courts all the judicial power of the
State not vested by the Constitution or laws consistent thdrewith exclusively in some other Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The following is a copy of the dedimus poles/a/em issued out
of the Superior Court of Suffolk, Massachusetts, authorizing
the taking of the deposition of Jonathan Bourne, Jr.:
COIMMON-WRALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Slofte

Superior
Court.

To any commissioner appointed by the Governor of said Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
or to any justice of the peace, notary public or
other officer legally empowered to take depositions or affidavits in the State of Oregon,

Greeting:
Assured of your prudence and fidelity, we do by thesefiresents appoint and empower you to take the deposition of Jonathan Bourne, Jr., of Portland, in said State of Oregon, to be
used in a suit now pending in our Superior Court, between
Annie B. Everett as plaintiff and John Stetson, Jr., as defendant; and, on certain days to be by you appointed, to cause the
deponent to come before you, and him carefully examine, on
oath or affirmation, in answer to several interrogatories hereto
annexed; and reduce the examination or cause the same to be
reduced to writing in your presence; and after such deposition
shall have been reduced to writing, it shall be carefully read to
or by deponent, and shall then be subscribed by him. You
shall permit neither party to attend at the taking of the deposition, either himself or by any attorney or agent, nor to communicate by interrogatories or suggestions with the deponent
whilst giving his deposition in answer to the interrogatories
annexed to this commission. And you shall take such deposition in a place separate and apart from all other persons, and
permit no person to be present at such examination except the
deponent and yourself and such disinterested person (if any)
as you may think to appoint as clerk to assist you in reducing
the deposition to writing. And you shall put the several interrogatories and cross-interrogatories to the deponent in their
order, and take the answer of the deponent to each, fully and
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clearly, before proceeding to the next, and not read to the deponent nor permit the deponent to read a succeeding interrogatory
until the answer to the preceding has been fully taken down.
Of this, our writ, with your doings by warrant of the same,
you will make return under seal unto our said Court with all
convenient expedition.
Witness the Honorable Albert Mason, Chief Justice of our
said Court, and the seal thereof of our city of Boston, on the
twenty-first day of November, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and ninety.
JOSEPH A. WILLARD, Clerk."
On the twenty-seventh day of June, 1891, a paper was served
-on the appellant, of which the following is a copy:
"SUPERIOR

COURT, NOVEMBER, 189 o .

ANNIn B. EVERETT, Plaintiff,

Suffolk, Ss.

V.

JOHN STETSON, Defendant.

J

To Jonathan Bourne, Jr.:
IN THE NAME OF TrHU STATE OF OREGON.

The undersigned notary public, having been duly designated
and appointed by the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, to take your testimony in a case now pending in
said Court, wherein Annie B. Everett is plaintiff, and John
Stetson, Jr., is defendant, now, therefore, you are hereby commanded to appear before the undersigned commissioner, at his
office, Room No. ii, in the First National Bank Building, on
the southeast corner of First and Washington Streets, in the
city of Portland, county of Multnomah, State of Oregon, on the
thirtieth day of June, 1891, at 9 o'clock in the forenoon of said
day, to give evidence in the above-entitled cause on the part of
the plaintiff.
Witness my hand and seal this twenty-seventh day of
June, 1891.
[Notary Seal]

A. C. EmmoNs,

Notary Public and Commissioner."
Thereafter on the fifth day of August, I89I, Bourne having
refused to appear before the commissioner, the Superior Court
of Suffolk, Massachusetts, issued letters rogatory, requesting the
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Circuit Court of Multnomah County to lend it assistance, and
cause Bourne to appear before the commissioner.
On the seventeenth day of September, 18gi, the Circuit Court
of Multnomah County, Oregon, ordered the clear of the following writ:
"In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, for the
County of Multnomah.
STATE OV OREGON,
COUNTY OF MUITNOMAH,

)
.

In the name of the State of Oregon:
Whereas, a commission was duly issued out of the Superior
Court for Suffolk County, Massachusetts, addressed to A. C.
Emmons, Esq., a notary public for the State of Oregon, to
take the deposition of Jonathan Bourne, Jr., of Portland, in
this State, to be used in a suit pending in said Superior Court
between Annie B. Everett as plaintiff and John Stetson, defendant, upon interrogatories and cross-interrogatories to be propounded to said witness.
And whereas said Bourne was duly notified and summoned
to appear before said notary public, commissioner, and give
answer to said interrogatories and cross-interrogatories to be
propounded to said witness, and whereas said Superior Court
of said Suffolk County has requested us by proper and usual
process of our Court to cause said Jonathan Bourne, Jr., to appear before said A. C. Emmons, Esq., commissioner, at a time
and place to be by us fixed, for examination on oath or affirmation to said interrogatories to said commission annexed, and
that we cause his deposition to be committed to writing and returned, and duly closed and sealed up and returned to said
Court; and that we afford our aid in the examination of said
witness by said commissioner upon said commission, and offering to do the same for us in a similar case when desired: Now,
therefore, we command you that you summon the said Jonathan Bourne, Jr., to appear before said A. C. Emmons, Esq.,
notary public, commissioner aforesaid, upon Monday, the
twenty-first day of September, i89i , at io o'clock A.M., and
at such further time or times to which the taking of said deposition may be adjourned by said commissioner at his office in
the city of Portland, in the First National Bank Building, cor-
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ner First and Washington Streets, then and there to testify in
said cause in answer to said interrogatories to be propounded
to him under said commission, and that you return this writ
with your doing herein to this Court.
Witness the seal of said Court and the hand of the clerk
thereof affixed at Portland, Oregon, on the seventeenth day of
September, i8gi.
[Seal of Circuit Court]
JNO. R. DUFF, Clerk,
By V. A. FRYER, Deputy."

This writ was duly served on the appellant in said city of
Portland. On the twenty-fourth day of September, i89 I , proof
by affidavit was duly submitted to said Circuit Court of the
service of said writ and of the non-attendance of said witness
at the time and place specified.
Thereafter and on the same day said Court made the following order:
"In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the
County of Multnomah.
THE STATE OF OREGON,

Plaintiff,

VJ.

Defendant. J
And now this day the affidavit of A. C. Emmons, Esq.,
having been filed in this Court in the matter entitled: 'In the
matter of letters rogatory from the Superior Court of Suffolk
County, Massachusetts, in the case of Annie B. Everett v.
John Stetson, Jr., pending therein, and it being shown to the
Court by said affidavit that the above-named Jonathan Bourne,
Jr., had disobeyed the process of this Court duly served upon
him, requiring him to appear and testify before said A. C. Emmons, notary public, as commissioner, under commission from
the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, in said
case of Everett v. Stetson pending therein, by failing to appear before said commissioner at the time and place named in
said process upon motion of Annie B. Everett by W. M.
Gregory, her-attorney. It is therefore ordered that said Jonathan Bourne, Jr., be required to be and appear before this Court
at 1.30 o'clock P.m. of this day, or if service hereof be not so
soon made upon him, then forthwith upon service hereof, then
and there to show cause why he should not be arrested to anJONATHAN BOURNE, JR.,
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swer for contempt of this Court in disobeying the lawful process
of this Court as above mentioned duly served upon him. It is
further ordered that a duly certified copy of this order be forthwith served upon said Jonathan Bourne, Jr.
Dated September 24, 1891.

E. D. SHATTUCK, Judge."
Bourne appeared in said court, pursuant to said order, and
filed an answer in substance as follows:
That in failing to appear and testify before A. C. Emmons,
Esq., notary public, commissioner appointed under the
commission issued by the Superior Court of Suffolk County,
State of Massachusetts, to take the deposition of said Bourne
as set forth in said order, the said Bourne disclaims any intention
of disrespect against this Court or its officers.
And further, answering said order, said Bourne alleges and
says :
"That this Court has no jurisdiction of the person of said
Bourne under this proceeding, and that this Court has no jurisdiction in the above-entitled matter, and that this Court has no
right of jurisdiction to punish said Bourne or to adjudge him
in contempt for failing, neglecting or refusing to appear before
said commissioner as a witness on Monday, the twenty-first day
of September, 1891, at 10 o'clock A.M., or at any other or further
time, at the office of said commissioner, at the city of Portland,
corner of First and Washington Streets, or at any other place,
or to testify in said cause of Ezerett v. Stetson, or to answer to
interrogatories to be propounded to him under said commission
in said cause of Everett v Stetson."
This answer was demurred to, which demurrer was sustained
by the Court, and thereupon said Court entered the following
judgment:
"That the defendant, Jonathan Bourne, Jr., be and he is
hereby committed to the jail of Multnomah County, State of
Oregon, for contempt of this Court, in disobeying the lawful
process of this Court, requiring him to appear before said A.
C. Emmons, Esq., notary public, commissioner, as herein recited, and that he be there kept in close confinement until he
be ready to and do appear before said commissioner to testify as
required by said process of this Court."
The appeal is from this judgment.
Fred. V. Hohnan, for appellant.
[V V!. Gregory, for respondent.
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STRAHAN, C. J.
It sufficiently appears from the foregoing
statement that the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, where the action of Annie B. Eve-et v. John Stetson,
Jr., is pending, tried through the usual instrumentality of a
commission on a dedirnus Polestatem to obtain the evidence of
the witness, and failed. Thereafter letters rogatory were issued,
under which the Circuit Court of Multnomah County has
taken the proceedings which have resulted in this appeal.
The real question here is one of jurisdiction.
At the outset
it is conceded that there is no statute in this State expressly
and in so many words conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit
Courts of this State in such cases.
The only statute having
any bearing on the subject is Section 790, Hill's Code, which
provides:
"The subpoena is issued as follows: . . . (2) To require
attendance before a commissioner appointed to take testimony
by a Court of the, United States, or a territory thereof, a
sister State, or any foreign country, by any clerk of a Court of
record, in places within the jurisdiction of such Court."
By this section a clerk of a Court of record is authorized to
issue a supoena, requiring the attendance of a witness before a'
commissioner appointed to.take testimony by a Court of a sister
State, and the subpoena, when issued, is the process of the
Court whose clerk issued it, and not of the clerk.
But counsel takes the objection here for the first time, so far as the
record discloses, that the paper issued by the clerk of the Circuit
Court of Multnomah County, and served upon Bourne, is not
a subfiena, and therefore he was not bound to obey it; and he
further insists that as no statute expressly confers jurisdiction
on the Circuit Court in such cases, it is without authority.
These objections may be considered together. This question is one involving the comity of States, grows out of necessity, and is recognized by the law of nations. In discussing it,
therefore, no narrow or merely technical view of the law is permissible. The Constitution of the State, Art. VII, Sec. 9,
vests in the Circuit Courts all the judicial power of the State
not vested by the Constitution or laws consistent therewith exclusively in some other Court. If the authority to require the
attendance of a witness before a commissioner appointed by a
Court of a sister State is a judicial power, and not being vested
exclusively in some other Court, then the same belongs to the
Circuit Courts, and even if the Constitution were silent upon the
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subject we think the result would be the same. In speaking
of this method of obtaining evidence, tGreenleafs Ev., Sec. 320,
says: ". . . This method of obtaining testimony from witnesses
in a foreign country has always been familiar in the Courts of
Admiralty; but it is also deemed to be within the inherent power
of all courts of justice. For by the law of nations, courts of
justice of different countries are bound mutually to aid and assist each other for the furtherance of justice; and hence, when
the testimony of a foreign witness is necessary, the Court before which the action is pending may send to the Court within
whose jurisdiction the witness resides a writ, either patent or
close, usually termed a letter rogatory, or a commission sub
mutuw vicissitudinis ob/entu ac in juris subsidium, from those
words contained in it. "
The same principle is stated in Weeks on Depositions, Sec.
128, and many authorities cited.
And the practice under such
letters is stated and discussed in Wharton's Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 722 e/seq.; 3 Wharton's International Law Digest, Sec. 413
el seq.,. Melson v. U. S., i Pet. C. C. R. 235; Kfuehling v. Liberman, 9 Phila. R. i6o; In re Jenckes, 6 R. I. 18. These authorities sufficiently show that the matter under consideration
is one of judicial cognizance. It appertains to the administration of justice in its best sense, and its exercise is now common
and unquestioned amongst civilized nations. It is true the
duty may not be imposed by positive local law, but it rests on
national comity, creating a duty that no State could refuse to
fulfil without forfeiting its standing amongst the civilized States
of the world.
Aside, then, from the statute quoted above, we think the Circuit Court of Multnomah County had jurisdiction over this case;
but the statute, no doubt, was designed to cover such cases.
The clerk of the Court, in issuing a writ of subpcena or other
writi, only exercises his appointed functions under the law; but
the writ, when issued, is the writ of the Court authenticated by
ts seal and over which it has jurisdiction. All writs so issued
protect the officer executing them, and the Court has power to
prevent all abuses growing out of their use.
As a necessary incident to this it may punish all disobedience
or resistance to its process and orders. This power inheres in
the Court, whether conferred by express statute or not.
It was finally argued that the writ which the clerk issued, and
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which was served on the appellant requiring him to appear and
submit to an examination, was not a subpoena.
Two answers may be made to this objection: The first is
that no such objection was taken in the Court below. The appellant did not there object that the writ was illegal or one that
he was not bound to obey because the writ was defective, but
his objection went to the jurisdiction of the Court. The one
now made goes to the means or manner of its exercise. But
whether taken here or in the Court below, the objection could
not be sustained. For all the purposes of this proceeding,
the writ which was served upon the appellant was a subpcena. It is true, it is not in the form in common use in the
Courts of this State, but it required the attendance of a witness
(Hill's Code, Sec. 789), and that is sufficient. It was finally
objected by the appellant that the Court in Massachusetts had
no authority to issue the letters rogatory. The ground of this
.objection is not clear to us, but we are unable to find any satisfactory foundation upon which it could be placed. We cannot
review the action of that Court or call in question its jurisdiction over the case pending before it. Any excess of authority
or irregularity in its exercise must be made in that Court, and
not here. It is sufficient for us to know that it has by letters
rogatory asked the aid of one of the Courts of this State, in obtaining the testimony of a witness domiciled here, in a case
pending before it and over which it has assumed jurisdiction.
We find no error in the judgment appealed from, and the
same is therefore affirmed.
Letters rogatory, when to issue
and practice relative thereto: 2
Wait's Practice 682; Wharton's Conflict of Law, secs. 722-73z, 2 Ed. ;
Greel. Ev., sec. 320; Lurnley v. Gee,
3 Ellis & Black. 114; Clay v. Stephenson, 7 Ad. & Ellis 185; Bolin v.
iT2elliden, 5 Rug. L. & Eq. 387, 3d
Ed. 585; Ponsfordv.O'Connor, 5 M.
& W. 573; Fischerv.Izataray,i El.,
Black. and El. 321; Pole v. Rogers.
3 Bing. N. C. 780; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend.475; Canjolev. Ferrie,
23 N. V. 93.
Contempt of Court. See A-MER-

ICAN

LAW

REGIsTER,

Vol.

20,

pages 81-93,145-159, 217-225, 289,
304, 361-373, 425-436.

Statutes conferring upon Courts
of record power to punish for contempt in certain cases do not
take away its common law power
to punish for contempt: People v.
Wilson, 64 Ill. 195.
Contempt before referees: Burl
v. Pyle, 89 Ind. 398; In re
Remington, 7 Wis. 643; Haight v.
Lucia, 36 Wis. 355; Seely & Johnson, 6Abb. Pr. 217; ExparteDoll,7
Phil. (Pa.) 218; Exparte Kreiger,
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7 Mo. App. 367; La Fontaine v.
Cox Cr. Cas. 139; Brown v. AnSouthern Unde-wrilers' Associa- drews, i Barb. (N. Y.) 227; Fisher
lion, 83 N. C. 132; -clarlan v. v. Hayes. 6 Fed. Rep. 63; Winslon
Van Syekel, io Bosw. N. V. 694:
v. vayson, 113 Mass. 4TI; Nelson
Heerdt v. It'ehnore, 2 Robt. 697.
v. Ewe'l, 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 271;
Contempt of one Court is not
Mcle'enzie v. MrcKenzie, ii Eng.
punishable in another: State v. Tii- L. & Eq. 41; People v. Craft, 7
ton, i Blackf. (Ind.) T66; A'ernodle Paige (N. Y.) 325; State v. Harv. Cason, 25 Ind. 362; _Phillips v.
per's Ferry Bridg'e Co., i6 W. Va.
W1relch, 12 Nev. T58; Rex v. alr- 864; Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355.
chelt, Str. 567; People v. County'
Where a witness under examinaJudge, 27 Cal. 151; Lord Mayor's tion before an officer not having
Case, 3 Wils. 188, 201;
ori.7 v. power to punish for contempt reWlhiehead, 65 N. C. 637; .cLattghfuses to answer a proper question.
lin v. Janney. 6 Gratt. (Va.', 6o9:
the officer should report to a Court
Smith v. Caldwell, Sneed tKy.
having jurisdiction, and ask it to
341; Johnston v. Cont. i Bibb. (Ky.)
compel an answer or punish the
598; Penn v. A"essinger. i Yeates
contumacious witness: Keller v.
(Pa.) 2; Exrparte Smith, 28 Ind. 47:
B. F. Goodrich Co., 117 Ind. 556.
Aforrison v. McDonald, 21 Ale.
On the principle of comity the
550: W14alson v. Williams, 36 Mis.
Courts of the State, where a deposi331; State v. M]'athezes, 37 N. H.
tion is taken to be used in another
450; Gates v. 3'Daniel.4 Stew. & State, will exercise their authority
P. (Ala.) 69; Ex parte Chamber- when appropriately invoked and
lain, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 49; Filling- will assist an officer within their
hast, Exvparte, 4 Pet. (U. S.) ioS.
jurisdiction when properly asked
How
contempt
proceedings
to secure answers to competent
should be entitled: Bronson's Case, questions: Keller v. B. F. Good12 Johns. (N. Y.) 460; Haight v.
rich Co., 117 Ind. 556.
7"urner, 2 Johns. (N. V.) 371; Fo.r
A commission rogatory for the
'. Cole, 6 T. R. 64o; Hollis v.
examination of a witness in a for1'randon, i Bos. & P. 36; Green v. eign country will not issue unless
ledshaw, i Bos. & P. 327; Clarke it appear that a difficulty exists in
v. Cawthorn, 8 T. R. 321; Re- v.
the execution of a commission to
Law'rene, Sayer 2i8; Rexv. Jones take testimony in the ordinary
and te.r v. Ro'inson, i Strange 704;
form: Froude v. Froude, 3 N. V.
Re.x v. Pierson, And. 313; Re.r v.
Supreme Ct. 79.
Htarrison,6 T. R. 60; 6 T. R. 641;
Members of Congress are not exBearan v. Beaz'an, 3 T. R. 60; 7 T. empt from service or obligation of
R. 438, 529; Faresv. Dieman, 7 T. subpoena in a criminal case, and letR. 661; Fell v. Jadwin, 3 Johns. ters will not be addressed by the
Court to them requesting to attend
(N. V.) 448; Phelps v. Hall, 5
Johns. (N.Y .) 367; U S. v. Wayne.
as witnesses. If after service of
i Wall. (U. S.) C. C. 134; People v.
subpcena the members do not atFerris,9 Johns. (N. Y.) 16o; I, ol- tend, a satisfactory reason may ap.er v. Ioagland, Johns. kN. Y.
pear to the Court to justify it:
United States v. Cooper,4 Dall. 341.
235, Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige
iN. V.) 36o; tst Cong. Church v.
The same power may be exer.ltscatine,2 Iowa 69; Re Rea, 14 cised by the Court, in which the
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action wherein the deposition was
taken is pending, to punish forcontempt, provided the commissioner,
instead of punishing for contempt,
reports the facts to the Court:
State ex -el.Lanning v. Lonsdale,
48 Wis. 348.
When the officer taking the deposition of a witness to be used'in an
action pending in Court of record
of this State, reports to the Court
in which such action is pending
that the witness has refused to answer certain interrogatories propounded to him, the Court should,
on application of the aggrieved
party, grant an order that the witness show cause why he should not
be required to answer such interrogatories. On the return of the
order, if the witness does not admit
his refusal to answer, proper interrogatories in that behalf should be
served upon him. 'If it appear by
his admission, or by his answer to
the interrogatories, or by proof, that
he has so refused, the Court will
decide whether he ought to answer
the questions which he refused to
answer; and if it is held that he
ought, the Court will make an order requiring him to go before the
officer and make answer thereto;
and in such case the Court in its
discretion may impose upon him
the costs of the proceeding. For
disobedience to such order the Court
should, on proper proceedings,
punish the witness as for a criminal
contempt: State ex rel. Lanning
v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348.
The prohibition of execution of
commissions in several countries
to examine witnesses has led to the

adoption of letters rogatory or requisitory, which are in fact applications in the name of one State,
through its Courts of Justice, to another State, to permit and assist in
obtaining of testimony: Refpublic
of Mexico v. Arrangois,3 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.) 471.
A witness before a grand jury refusing to be sworn, or who behaves
disrespectfully, may be lawfully detained and taken before the Court
in order to obtain its aid and direction: Heard v. Pierce, 8 Cush.
(Mass.) 338Only Federal Courts and State
Courts invested with general common law powers, except specially
authorized by statute, have power
to aid foreign Courts in the execution of their commission or receive letters rogatory: Petition to
aidPoreign Commission, 5 Sandf.
(N. Y.) 674.
The examination of a witness before trial by a commissioner by
authority of a statute is strictly a
statutory proceeding; and the officer conducting it, whether a judge
at chambers, the county judge or a
court commissioner, has no power
to punish for such contempt, unless
specially conferred by the statute:
Stuart v. Allen et al., 45 Wis. 158;
In re Remington, 7 Wis. 643; Apfileton v. Afpfileton, 5o Barb. 486;
People v. Brennan,45 Barb. 344The Court will require, before aiding a commissioner to compel a
witness to answer an interrogatory
propounded, that the question be
relevant and material to the case
or hearing: In refudson, 3 Blatchford 148.

